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Introduction 
Social psychologists have long noted that the larger a group, the 
more complex are the patterns of interaction among its members 1 and 
that within these groups it is not unusual for informal subgroups to form 
which help to mediate and simplify these interactions. The United States 
House of Representatives is undeniably a large group ( with a possible 
94,395 dyadic relationships among its 435 members) which must act in 
certain formal patterns to accomplish its goals. It has been hypothesized 
that the structure of th e House of Representatives is not a composite 
of the individual behavior of 435 isolated members, but rather that it is a 
network of many informal groups and relationships. 2 All that we know 
of group interaction and of state and federal legislatures would lead us 
to be certain of this. 
The informal groups that form within the legislature serve many 
functions. Among these, information and communications services, norm 
setting, and protection in the form of security of numbers are probably 
the most important. It is well known that Congressmen have little time 
to research and make individual decisions on the many hundr eds of 
pieces of legislation that come before their consideration each session. 
Thus the representative must rely upon some external source to offer 
0 This is a revised version of a paper prepared for presentation at the Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, April 27-29, 
1972. 
The data utilized in this study were made available by the Inter-University 
Consortium for Political Research. The data were supplied in partially proofed form 
and the Consortium bears no responsibility for either the analyses or interpretations 
presented here. 
1 John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, Th e Social Psychology of Groups 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 191 ff. 
2 Alan Fiellin, "The Function s of Informal Groups in Legislative Institutions," 
Journal of Politics, 24 (February, 1962) , pp. 90-91. 
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him cues as to how he should cast his votes.3 Informal groups may serve 
this purpose. In addition to his personal considerations of issues, another 
concern of most legislators is re-election. 4 Thus the representative must 
constantly be aware of the reactions of his constituents. 5 For this reason 
a legislator may feel safer voting with a group that he can trust and that 
his constituents are likely to consider an appropriate reference group. 
Stevens argued that such a group would be the Congressman's state 
party delegation. 6 After all, Stevens argued, if the entire state party 
delegation voted one way on a bill, an individual congressman couldn't 
have been expected to reach a different decision. The notion of safety 
in numbers offers prot ection. A Congressman's constituents are less likely 
to fault him if he could indicate that he was not deviating from the 
pattern that a large and relevant group felt was the correct way to vote. 
The structuring of a potentially disorganized world is a basic need 
for all men. Legislators, probably no more or less than other political 
decision-makers who are faced with a policy decision which might be 
implemented by several courses of action, must seek methods for coping 
with an environment which emits conflicting stimuli. Evidence suggests 
that legislators seek cues from appropriate reference groups which guide 
them throughout the often confusing maze of work.7 And, as we indi-
cated above, the state party delegation seemingly is one of the most 
satisfactory reference groups. 
The basis of the state party delegation as a source of decision-making 
cues stems from the perceived similarity between the individual congress-
man's policy preference and those of some other member or members. As 
a cue giving group, the state party delegation obviously satisfies a basic 
criterion in this regard. Since significant diversity exists within parties, 
the party label cannot always suffice as a source of cues. However, this 
diversity often disappears when the cue taking is reduced to the state 
level. 
But so long as the cue theory is premised upon the perceived similari-
ties between a congressman and some group to which he either aspires or 
belongs, there is reason to suspect that within delegations from states 
containing metropolitan areas, that the underlying similarity within the 
3 Fiellin, pp. 72-91; Donald R. Matthews and James A. Stimson, "Decision 
Making by U. S. Representatives: A Preliminary Model," in S. Sidney Ulmer (ed.), 
Political Decision-Making (New York: Van Nostrand, 1970), pp. 14-43; Arthur G. 
Stevens, Jr., "The State Party Delegation and Decision-Making in the House of 
Representatives," rnimeo, Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Asso-
ciation, 1969. 
4 Stevens, p. 1. 
5 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," 
American Political Science Review; 57 ( March, 1963), pp. 45-46 . 
6 Stevens, pp. 3-9. 
7 Matthews and Stimson. 
METROPOLITAN DELEGATIONS IN THE U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 49 
Congressman's own party may not be the strongest. Thus the question 
becomes one of the level of cue taking. Matthews and Stimson suggest 
that there are few groups that may offer most cues; the state party seems 
to be the most relevant for most congressmen. However, when a con-
gressman is elected from a substantial metropolitan area whose delegation 
itself may be as larg e as a state party delegation in some smaller state, a 
metropolitan delegation may serve the same function as the state dele-
gation. In other words, just as the party in Congress is too amorphous a 
group from which a legislator could take reliable cues, so too may the 
state party delegation itself be too varied, especially when a metropolitan 
or metropolitan party delegation may exist whose members share similar 
electoral problems. 8 
There are numerous states where metropolitan delegations are large 
enough to have formed their own informal groups. Several factors are 
present which would facilitate the formation of these informal groups. 
First, many of the issues considered in Congress are of particular impor-
tance to metropolitan areas. Second, the homogeneity of shared norms and 
attitudes is likely to be greater among representatives from metropolitan 
areas.9 Third, within large state delegations, a subgroup of small size 
might improve communications and allow for considerably more mutual 
trust among the Congressmen. Finally, if an individual is looking for 
security in numbers to alleviate the psychological pressures of policy de-
cisions, he might well regard other metropolitan representatives as a more 
logical reference group than an entire, and more diverse, state delegation. 
However, for protection of this nature, the metropolitan group must be 
large enough to give the legislator the security he desires. 
Most writers that have examined informal groups within the House 
of Representatives have examined either the committee structure or party 
delegations, including party delegations within a state delegation. 10 If, 
however, what we have hypothesized is correct, an examination of metro-
s Ibid. These authors recognize this possibility. Their state party delegation in 
some cases are broken into smaller units, e.g., in New York City and Upstate 
New York. 
o Samuel C. Patterson, "Patterns of Interpersonal Relations in a State Legis-
lative Group: The Wisconsin Assembly," Public Opinion Quarterly, 23 ( Spring 
1959), pp. 101-109. 
10 David B. Truman, "The State Delegations and the Structure of Party Voting 
in the United States House of Representatives," American Political Science Review, 
50 (December 1956), pp. 1023-45 ; John H. Kessel, "The Washington Congressional 
Delegation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 8 ( February 1964), pp. 1-21; 
Matthews and Stimson; Barbara Deckard, "State Party Delegations in the U. S. 
House of Representatives-A Comparative Study of Group Cohesion," Journal 
of Politics, 34 ( February 1972), pp. 199-222; Charles S. Bullock, III. "The Influence 
of State Party Delegations on House Committee Assignments," Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, 15 (August, 1971 ), pp. 525-546. 
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politan delegations should indicate that some characteristics of an in-
formal group exists. 
Though group characteristics are indicated in numerous ways, and 
possibly the best way of getting at group interaction would be through 
interviews or by unobtrusively following legislators around day after day 
to record their interactions and conversations, we are often limited to 
indirect measures of group interaction and cohesion. One such method is 
to examine voting data for clustering of votes. Fiellin indicated in his 
study of the New York State Democratic Party delegation that there was 
conscious bloc voting on occasion.11 Logrolling has been discussed by 
numerous political scientists in other situations as well.12 
While it is not necessarily true that similar voting patterns are certain 
to have developed through direct or indirect interaction, it is likely that 
interaction either aids the voting pattern or that individuals who vote 
similarly ( and therefore think similarly, have similar constituency, or 
shared attitudes), are likely to eventually begin to interact. 13 It is true 
that analysis of roll call votes provide only partial information that could 
positively identify a group. However, despite the numerous problems of 
using roll call votes for this purpose, Stevens has concluded that it is 
possible to identify informal groups through the utilization of the roll 
call.14 
The Probl,em 
Stevens has already established that state party delegations tend to 
bloc together at a level higher than might be expected by chance. We 
decided to inspect metropolitan delegations within these state delegations 
to the United States House of Representatives. There are only seven 
states that have a delegation from any single metropolitan area that ex-
ceeds five members. We felt, for the following reasons, that it was neces-
sary to examine only metropolitan delegations of five members or more. 
First, a group must reach a certain size before it can perform any of the 
functions that make its being meaningful. Five members appeared to 
make some sense. The arbitrary selection of five as a cutoff point also 
meant that we were likely to be able to look at metropolitan party dele-
gations as well as entire metropolitan delegations. Finally, for methodo-
logical reasons that will be discussed at a later point, when we were 
11 Fiellin, pp. 84-88. 
12 See particularly James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of 
C011Sent (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), part III; also William 
C. Mitchell, Public Choice in America (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971), 
pp. 123 ff. and p. 288 ff. 
13 Thibaut and Kelley, Chapters 5 and 11; Patterson. 
14 Stevens, p. 36. 
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examining the patterns of bloc voting, we wanted a large enough group 
so that we might be able to systematically exclude a certain percentage 
of each delegation. If our metropolitan delegations had been smaller 
than five, this would have been difficult to do. There were seven states 
that contained metropolitan delegations of at least five congressmen: Cali-
fornia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York and 
Pennsylvania. 15 
The first proposition that interested us was whether or not the metro-
politan delegations exhibited more cohesion than state delegations of 
which they were a part. Secondly, we were interested in whether the 
metropolitan party delegations had more cohesion than the state party 
delegations. 
Method 
In performing a roll call analysis one has several options in choosing 
a technique. We were interested in finding out whether a metropolitan 
delegation, within a state delegation, voted together more frequently 
than did the state delegation as a whole. Thus we sought a method that 
would allow us to process our data on a state by state basis, and within 
the state allow us to follow the patterns for forming ( or dissolving) 
voting blocs. An hierarchial clustering scheme developed by Stephen 
Johnson appeared to be the most appropriate. 16 This method of cluster-
ing begins from a matrix of proximities that ( in this specific case) relate 
all legislators to each other. The first step, then, involved the construction 
of an Index of Agreement (IA) between each pair of legislators within 
a state delegation. The resulting IA matrix could then be subjected to 
a hierarchical cluster analysis. In a relatively small state delegation of 
12 representatives there would be 66 different IA's. In a larger state 
delegation of 40 representatives, this would involve the calculation of 
780 IA's. Each IA was calculated using the formula F /T where F is 
equal to the number of times the two legislators either both voted for 
or both voted against a bill and T is equal to the number of times that 
both legislators voted on a bill.17 All votes on which either one of the 
legislators was absent or was not recorded was excluded from considera-
tion. The IA is thus a simple proportion of agreements between the two 
15 California: Los Angeles and San Francisco; Illinois: Chicago; Massachusetts: 
Boston; Michigan: Detroit; New Jersey: New York City Metro area; New York: 
New York City; Pennsylvania: Philadelphia. 
16 Stephen C. Johnson, "Hierarchical Clustering Schemes," "Psycho-metrika, 
32 (September, 1971 ), pp. 241-254. 
17 See discussion of measures of interpersonal agreement in Lee F. Anderson, 
et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University 
Press, 1966), pp. 40 ff; By vote we also mean publically announced or paired.) 
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legislators. Once this IA matrix is obtained, one needs to begin clustering 
those individuals with high indices of agreement together in a systematic 
form. 
The hierarchical clustering technique does just this . It begins by 
assuming that there are the same number of clusters as there are ( in 
this case) legislators . If we are working with a delegation of 12 legis-
lators and each legislator forms his own cluster, we have 12 clusters. 
An examination of the IA scores is then carried out in order to seek the 
point of highest inter-agreement where two ( or more) legislators might 
be joined together. This conceivably could occur between more than a 
single pair of legislators simultaneously, though it usually does not. That 
is, Legislator A and Legislator D might agree 96.8% of the time, and 
Legislator C and Legislator G might also agree 96.8% of the time. If 
this occurs, at the next level the number of clusters might be reduced 
from an original 12 to 10 clusters. Each of eight legislators remain 
separate, i.e., they form an isolated cluster. Legislators A and D form 
the ninth cluster and Legislators C and G form the tenth cluster. One 
then again searches for th e next highest level where either a new cluster 
might be formed between isolated legislators , or where an isolated legis-
lator might be added to another group cluster. This process of continu-
ing to seek the next lowest point of agreement where the clusters may 
be enlarged continues until the point is reached where the entire state 
delegation is in one cluster. This may be reached at 0.0% level of agree-
ment, or in some cases at a positive level of agreement. Johnson's 
algorithm allows one to observe the exact pattern of blocking from 
isolated legislators through the clustering of the entire state delegation. 
One can easily observe who blocs with whom and in what order , as 
well as at exactly what level each cluster formation takes place. We 
have included a sample output cluster diagram from the OSIRIS pro-
gram HICLSTR, which utilizes Johnson's algorithm. 18 This example may 
make the process from beginning to end more simply understood. 
Figure 1 is the result of processing the IA matrix presented in 
Table 1 in the fashion just described . There were 18 Congressional 
districts in Michigan during the 86th Congress. At the top of the plot 
each district forms its own cluster. Obviously, at this level there will 
always be 100% interagre ement , as each legislator is isolated with only 
his own votes. The program then locates the legislators that clustered 
together at the highest level of interagreem ent. These were the Con-
gressmen from Districts 16 and 17. They were connected in the plot. 
18 Inter-University Consortium for Political Resear ch, OSIRIS II: OS USERS 
Manual ( Ann Arbor; 1971) , pp. 409-414. 
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TABLE 1. Index of Agreement Matrix for Michigan Delegation to the U. S. House of Representatves, 86th Congress 
District 
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 .473 .251 .267 .470 .581 .886 .503 .528 .417 .468 .589 .902 .882 .903 .878 .897 .538 
2 .763 .739 .868 .763 .423 .770 .816 .838 .756 .635 .397 .465 .403 .439 .456 .739 
3 .906 .707 .611 .242 .670 .641 .802 .759 .631 .244 .299 .248 .256 .290 .641 
.686 .606 .652 .305 .229 . 275 .628 
..... 
4 .240 .623 .826 .742 .628 .232 .246 0 
5 .858 .418 .797 .901 .892 .691 .531 .422 .443 .422 .426 .446 .778 I 6 .554 .848 .892 .770 .691 .623 .566 .578 .520 .550 .581 .795 
7 .446 .512 .357 .447 .559 .920 .903 .911 .910 .817 .544 0 "1 
8 .813 .781 .759 .666 .460 .482 .419 .464 .479 .761 "d 0 
9 .720 .599 .489 .493 .475 .525 .539 .843 ~ 10 .764 .598 .350 .380 .335 .350 .401 .736 
11 .794 .440 .506 .438 .462 .485 .771 r:,, 
12 .575 .607 .553 .567 .586 .630 i 
13 .919 .929 .903 .914 .510 &l 
14 .896 .867 .902 .548 
15 .905 .886 .505 
16 .942 .573 
17 .585 
-
18 
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The total number of clusters is reduced to seventeen . Sixteen clusters 
are still isolated legislators and one cluster now contains two legislators. 
In Table 2 we see that the level of interagreement for the cluster formed 
when there were seventeen clusters in 94.2%. The program then seeks 
another cluster. This time the Congressmen from Districts 13 and 15 
are joined at the 92.9% interagreement level ( see Table 2) which re-
duces the number of clusters to sixteen. The program then finds that 
the Congressman from District 7 is in agreement with both members 
of a previous cluster at 91.1 % and thus he is added to the cluster of 
legislators 13 and 15. We may follow the formation of clusters through 
the entire state delegation, observing the order and level at which 
clusters form. 
TABLE 2. Interagreement Level for Formation of Clusters 
Michigan Del egation to the U.S. House of Representatives , 86th Congress 
# of Clusters Level of Agreement 
18 .............................. . .. .......... ... . . 
17 ...... ... ............ .. .. . ... . ...... . ........... . 942 
16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .929 
15 ............... . .......... . ...................... 911 
14 .................... ..................... ....... . 906 
13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .901 
12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .896 
11 ................................................ . 882 
10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .867 
9 ....... . ........ . ........... .... ......... . ...... . 858 
8 ....... . .................... .. .. ... ............. . 838 
7 ............. .. .... . .... . .. . .. . .... . ..... . .. . ... . 797 
6 ........... ...... . .... ........ . .................. 794 
5 .. ............ . . ... . ... . ... .................... . . 763 
4 ................ ... . ... . .. .. . . . ... . ..... . . ..... . . 735 
3 ..... . . . .. . .............. . .... . ............ . .... . 628 
2 ......... .. ... . ............... ..... ............. . 531 
1 ..................................... .. . . .... .. .. 229 
The Analysis 
In addition to spreading our analysis over a relatively broad geo-
graphical base, we also examined clusters for each of seven Congresses. 
The Congresses examined were the 84th through 90th. Thus, if we 
found that metropolitan delegations do form informal voting groups, 
we also would be able to see if these groups exist over time. 
Our first and most basic question was whether metropolitan dele-
gations tended to vote together more often than did entire state delega-
tions. To ascertain this we compared the blocking levels of the metro-
politan representatives within a state with those of the state delegation 
as a whole for each metropolitan area and each session of Congress. 
However, we were presented with one difficulty. It was impossible for 
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any subgroup of a total state delegation to bloc at a level lower than 
the entire delegation, The interagreement level of the metropolitan and 
the state delegation may, however, be equal. Thus we decided that 
though we did want to examine the blocking level for 100% of each 
group, we would also see at what point thre e quarters of each group 
agreed. By choosing to look at the level of agreement at which 75% of 
each group blocked, we were allowing at least one representative to be 
systematically discarded from most subgroups. Thus, it was now possible 
to have subgroups of a state delegation, e.g., metropolitan delegations, 
bloc at a lower level of agreement than the state delegation. Our proce-
dure was to locate the point at which the entire state delegation blocked. 
We then compared that with the point at which the entire metropolitan 
delegation blocked. We also located the point at which thr ee-qua rters 
of the members of the state delegation blocked and compared that to 
the level where three-quarters of the metropolitan delegation blocked. 
If there were twenty representatives in the state delegation we would 
seek the level of agreement for all twenty, then for only fifteen. If within 
the delegation of twenty, there were eight metropolitan representatives, 
we would seek the level where all eight blocked, then we would seek 
the level where six of the eight blocked. Our results are exhibited in 
Table 3. 
For each state and for each group there is a possibility of four 
entries in Table 3. For instance, if we examine New Jersey for a com-
parison of metropolitan republicans to the state republicans ( with 75% 
of the delegates considered), we can see the four entries. The upper 
left portion of the cell indicates that in two cases the metropolitan 
delegation formed a bloc at a greater IA level than the corresponding 
state delegation. The lower left portion of the cell indicates that the 
metropolitan delegation formed a bloc one time at a lower level than 
the corresponding state delegation . The lower right portion of the cell 
indicates in three years the metropolitan delegation formed a bloc at 
the same IA level as the corresponding state delegation. Finally , the 
upper right portion of each cell indicates the number of years for which 
there was no metropolitan delegation large enough to analyze. Zero 
entries were omitted from the table. 
When all cases are examined only in two of the eight metropolitan 
areas and in only one Congress each, did the metropolitan delegation 
bloc higher than the entire state delegation. However , when we examined 
levels of agreement for three quarters of the representatives, we found 
that in almost half of the cases the level of agreement for the metro-
politan delegations was higher over the seven Congresses and eight 
TABLE 3. Summary for the 84th Through the 90th Congress of the Number of Times a Metropolitan Subgroup Forms a § Bloc at an IA Level That Is Greater Than, Equal To or Less Than Its Corresponding State Delegation 
Total Calif. Calif. Ill. Mass. Mich. N.J. N.Y. Penn. ~ (L.A.) (S. F.) § 
All Delegates in Group ~ metropolitan/ state 
........ 
2g 154e 
-/To -/To - !To - !To ::_I  -!To -ITo ::_h; ! 6e 
~,~ ::_h; 
- !To - \To ::_l~ -\To C) metro dems/ state dems . . . . 15g,_ ~,- ~,-~ 4le 3e 3e 0 z 
V, 
metro reps/ state reps . . . . . 18gl 13N ::_,  
~,-~1 ::_1~ -,~ ~,~ ::_l_ ::_I-lz 25e 5e 4e 2e 3e 6e 5e i 
75% Delegates in Group ~ 
metropolitan / state 
.... . ... 
2
:~ ,32e ::_,~ 
- /To ~1- 3g I ~1- ::_I  ::_I-::_!~ ?' ::r: 2e IL 3e 5e 5e 0 q 
metro dems/ state dems . . . . 24g ,_ 
~,-4g ! ~1- lg I lg I 4g I ~1-~1-~ 0 7L25e 4e IL 2e 3e 2L 4e 2L 4e 2L le 4e 3e "1 1;l 
metro reps/s tate reps ..... 19G,13N 3g I 4g l ~1~ ::_ 15N -rN ::_!IN ~1-lg ! "C ~ 4L20e IL 3e IL 2e IL 3e 4e IL 5e t'1 
g = Metropolitan D elegatio n bl ocke d at a grea ter IA lev el th an correspond ing state deleg ation. i e = Metr opolit an D elega tion bl ocked at th e sam e IA level as th e corr espond ing sta te delega tion . L = Metropolitan Delega tion blocked at a lower IA level than the correspond ing state delegatio n. N = Metropolitan Delega tions lar ge enough to analyze were non-existant. 
~ 
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metropolitan areas than for the state delegation . Not only did twenty-
three metropolitan delegations bloc at a higher level than the state 
delegation, but only one metropolitan delegation had a lower level of 
agreement than the state delegation. For the remainder of the cases 
the level of agreement for the state and the metropolitan delegations 
was equal. 
As we have previously noted, party is quite obviously a factor in 
achieving agreement. This was apparent in the cluster diagrams that 
we obtained . For most of our clusters, party was as clear a determinant 
as it is in the example in Figure l. For this reason we compared each 
metropolitan party delegation with each state party delegation. There 
is an increase in the proportionate number of metropolitan groups that 
bloc at a higher level than the state party delegations. It should be 
noted that in only one case. does any metropolitan delegation cluster at 
a level lower than the entire state delegation . Similarly, few metropolitan 
party delegations cluster lower than a state party delegation. Of course, 
where we are examining the level of agreement for 100% of the repre-
sentatives of a group ( first three rows in table 3) that would be im-
possible, but for the remainder of the cases there is nothing that would 
prevent or hamper a metropolitan delegation from having agreement 
levels lower than a state delegation. There app ears to be little question 
that metropolitan delegations have some affinity. They do bloc together 
at levels higher than the entire delegation . 
Since the linkage between a Congressman and the state party dele-
gation stems from perceived similarities between the group and the 
individual so that reliable communicative and socialization cues can 
be taken , we investigated whether or not the metropolitan party dele-
gation might serve a comparable function. Our findings indicate that 
when 75% of the delegation is examined, ( 1) there was higher inter-
agreement rates among the metropolitan Congressman than among the 
state delegation; and ( 2) that when we control for party we find the 
same, that the metropolitan party delegations bloc at a higher level 
than the state. party delegation . 
These findings tentatively support our hypothesis concerning the 
significance of the metropolitan delegations. Yet, it is difficult to assess 
the importance of roll call vote analysis without other supportive evi-
dence , although it should be pointed out that other studies have indi-
cated that informal groups do tend to bloc vote.19 There are also logical 
reasons for expecting, especially in large state delegations , metropolitan 
delegations to form informal groups. The exhibition that the bloc voting 
19 Feillin; Stevens. 
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does exist is certainly a strong indication that metropolitan grouping 
does exist. As our urban areas grow larger and larger and as more of 
the domestic problems that the American government faces directly 
concerns the metropolitan areas, it makes sense to seek out additional 
evidence of cooperation within state delegations of metropolitan Con-
gressmen. One path of investigation that should aid us in ascertaining 
the strength of and motivation for metropolitan voting groups would 
be to study the voting activity of the metropolitan delegations on certain 
limited subject areas. For instance, one might expect a metropolitan 
delegation to bloc more closely on votes dealing with welfare or urban 
policy. However , if we were to discover that the metropolitan delegates 
bloc heavily on, for instance, foreign policy, this would give us some 
clues that the motivating factors were not necessarily issues that affected 
their constituency. It may be that this cooperation and informal group-
ing is not just for single metropolis' but from urban areas located through-
out a state. There may also exist evidence of coalitions between metro-
politan delegations across state lines. Evidence of bloc voting can pro-
vide only inferential evidence. To gather further proof will take extensive 
examination by scholars with knowledge of the varied state delegations. 
In addition, we also need evidence gathered in a manner that will allow 
examination of motivation, as well as action, such as survey instruments 
might afford. 
